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INTRODUCTION
Around a large table in the Orange County Superior Courthouse sits a group
of important women discussing difficult juvenile court cases. Commissioner Jane
Shade, the presiding judge of the Orange County Girls Court, leads the meeting.
Five cases are on calendar for the afternoon, and those around the table listen
intently as one of the social workers talks about the first girl’s week. The
Department of Health representative then discusses the girl’s mental health status.
Next, the Department of Education representative talks about the girl’s recent
performance in school. These women clearly know the girl well and they discuss
her situation in detail. Commissioner Shade draws the discussion on this first case
to a close, noting how well the girl is doing and what progress she has made since
her last court date. Only then do they move on to the second girl on calendar. The
attention to detail and enthusiasm with which the girls are discussed at the
meeting make clear that these women take seriously their roles as mentors.
During the summer of 2010, I had the privilege of working at the Orange
County Juvenile Court. While there, I observed the proceedings in delinquency
courtrooms, dependency courtrooms, and the Girls Court. I also observed the
creation of the Boys Court. The Boys and Girls Courts are gender-segregated1
collaborative courts, which serve to focus attention on the individual boys and
girls in the juvenile dependency system.2 Throughout the summer, I was able to
observe the enthusiasm and dedication of the people who work at the Orange
County Juvenile Court, and I saw how those sentiments transferred to the creation
and implementation of their Girls and Boys Courts.
The juvenile justice system has evolved in recent years. For instance, the
Annie E. Casey Foundation’s Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative (“JDAI”)

1. While the terms sex and gender are often used interchangeably in the literature regarding
gender segregation, the term gender is used to refer to gender and sex segregation in the context of
the Boys and Girls Courts. This is because, presumably, if a male individual identifies as a female and
lives life as a female, she will be grouped in the Girls Court rather than the Boys Court, thus
segregating by the cultural notion of gender. Similarly, a sex-typical male will be grouped in the Boys
Court, thus segregating by sex. These two examples illustrate that Boys and Girls Courts allow for
classifications based on both gender and sex. This Note uses the word gender to refer to these
classifications in the Boys and Girls Courts because ultimately, the classification is based on gender if
it takes into account an individual’s gender identity when classifying that individual, whether or not
that gender identity is consistent with his or her sex. However, the word sex is used instead of the
word gender when addressing the biological arguments that arise in this context. For a discussion of
the biological and cultural differences between the terms, see Leslie Bender, Sex Discrimination or
Gender Inequality?, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 941, 945–46 (1989).
2. See Collaborative Courts, OCCOURTS, http://www.occourts.org/directory/collaborativecourts (last visited Mar. 30, 2012) (Collaborative courts “are specialized court tracks that address
underlying issues that may be present in the lives of persons who come before the court on criminal,
juvenile, or dependency matters. These life-changing programs involve active judicial monitoring, a
team approach to decision making, and include the participation of a variety of different agencies,
such as Probation and health treatment providers.”).
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strives to find alternatives to incarceration for juveniles.3 Some counties have
developed programs centered on the individual needs of boys and girls in juvenile
detention centers.4 Hawaii has developed a Girls Court to help girls navigate the
delinquency system,5 focusing not on the detention aspects of the system, but
rather on structuring the girls’ court visits and other activities in ways conducive to
their rehabilitation. Similarly, on the dependency side, the Orange County Superior
Court has developed collaborative Boys and Girls Courts to help dependent
youths navigate the court system and learn to cope with the various issues they
face.
While these programs have made a valuable contribution to the innovation
of the juvenile justice system, gender-segregated courts raise several equal
protection concerns. The gender-segregated court programs serve admirable
purposes, but many of them are arguably unrelated to gender segregation. For that
reason, they are unlikely to meet intermediate scrutiny, the standard applied to
analyze an equal protection challenge on the basis of gender, and are therefore
likely to violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In
addition, the hiring of all-female staffs in the Girls Court programs is likely an act
of impermissible employment discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause
and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.
This Note focuses on two questions related to Equal Protection. First, it
analyzes the issues raised by gender-segregated juvenile courts in both the
dependency and delinquency systems. Second, it addresses the equal protection
and statutory issues raised by the hiring of all-female staffs for the Girls Courts.
This Note discusses three collaborative courts—Orange County’s Girls and Boys
Courts, which are dependency courts, and Hawaii’s Girls Court, which is a
delinquency court.6 Part I describes the juvenile justice system in general and the
Orange County and Hawaii collaborative courts in particular. Part II discusses the
intermediate scrutiny standard, determines whether these courts satisfy that
standard, and discusses possible alternatives that will more likely satisfy the
standard. Part III examines the employment discrimination concerns raised by the

3. Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative, ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., http://www.aecf
.org/MajorInitiatives/JuvenileDetentionAlternativesInitiative.aspx (last visited Mar. 30, 2012) (JDAI
“was designed to support the Casey Foundation’s vision that all youth involved in the juvenile justice
system have opportunities to develop into healthy, productive adults. . . . JDAI focuses on the
juvenile detention component of the juvenile justice system because youth are often unnecessarily or
inappropriately detained at great expense, with long-lasting negative consequences for both public
safety and youth development.”).
4. Thomas Carroll, Gender and Juvenile Justice: New Courts, Programs Address Needs of Girls, YOUTH
L. NEWS (July–Sept. 2009), http://www.youthlaw.org/publications/yln/2009/july_september_2009/
gender_and_juvenile_justice_new_courts_programs_address_needs_of_girls.
5. Welcome to Hawaiʻi Girls Court, HAW. GIRLS CT., http://www.girlscourt.org (last visited
Mar. 30, 2012).
6. These are court programs, rather than detention facilities, which raise other constitutional
issues.
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all-female staff of the Girls Courts in order to determine the feasibility of
implementing or maintaining these structures from an employment standpoint.
I. UNDERSTANDING THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM AND THE INDIVIDUAL
COLLABORATIVE COURTS
This Part provides background information on the juvenile justice system, as
well as a specific look at each collaborative court at issue in this Note. Section A
discusses the juvenile justice system. Section B discusses the different
circumstances of boys and girls in relation to this system, providing context for
why individual attention to the distinct situations of male and female offenders is
necessary. Section C describes the Orange County collaborative dependency
courts. Finally, Section D provides an overview of Hawaii’s collaborative
delinquency court.
A. Description of the Juvenile Justice System
The juvenile justice system has two separate components: delinquency and
dependency. The delinquency system determines whether a minor has broken the
law and how he or she should be punished or rehabilitated.7 The dependency
system, on the other hand, protects children who have been abused or neglected,
physically, emotionally, or both, by their primary caregivers.8 The dependency
system takes children out of harmful family situations and plays a temporary role
until a child can be placed in a permanent home, whether with the child’s family, a
legal guardian, or an adoptive family.9 The goal of the dependency system is to
place children in the best possible familial environment.10 The delinquency and
dependency systems are necessarily linked; children who have been abused or
neglected “are at greater risk for delinquency, violence, self-destructive behaviors,”
and other negative outcomes than children who have not been abused or
neglected.11
Gender-segregated collaborative courts exist in both the dependency and the
delinquency systems. Orange County’s programs are dependency courts,
addressing the needs of youths when they have been neglected or abused. Hawaii’s
Girls Court program is a delinquency court, dealing with the retribution and
rehabilitation of juveniles who have committed crimes. While there is a difference

7. LaShanda Taylor, A Lawyer for Every Child: Client-Directed Representation in Dependency Cases, 47
FAM. CT. REV. 605, 613 (2009) (quoting MICHAEL D. GRIMES, PATCHING UP THE CRACKS: A CASE
STUDY OF JUVENILE COURT REFORM 12 (2005)).
8. Id.
9. THE 15TH ANNUAL REPORT ON THE CONDITIONS OF CHILDREN IN ORANGE COUNTY
119 (2009), available at http://ochealthinfo.com/docs/occp/report2009/index.htm [hereinafter
CONDITIONS OF CHILDREN].
10. Id.
11. Id. at 117.
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between dependency and delinquency court proceedings, the line between the two
is very thin. Research has shown that children who have been abused or neglected,
often resulting in their entrance into the dependency system, “are at greater risk
for delinquency . . . .”12 Later, when children turn eighteen and leave the
dependency system, they typically lack “adequate independent living skills.”13 The
consequence is that many experience “incarceration, homelessness, poverty, and
under/unemployment.”14 Thus, young adults previously in the dependency system
often become involved in the adult criminal system. For this reason, both
delinquency and dependency collaborative courts focus on many of the same
issues.
These collaborative courts differ from traditional juvenile courts, where
meetings about the boys and girls happen only in the courtroom. In traditional
delinquency courtrooms, the only people present are the child, the child’s parent
or guardian in some cases, the child’s attorney, the District Attorney, a court clerk,
a court reporter, and the judge. In traditional dependency courtrooms, attorneys
are generally present for all parties, including the child, the parents, and the
Department of Social Services. Many of the same parties are involved in both
traditional proceedings and in collaborative court meetings. Rather than acting as
adversaries as they would in traditional court proceedings, however, these
individuals work together in the collaborative courts to reach the best solution for
each child. Of course, the goal of all juvenile court proceedings is to achieve the
best outcome for each child. Arguably, though, the collaborative courts are more
effective at reaching the goal because all parties strive to work together. The
ultimate focus of the juvenile justice system is rehabilitation,15 and a
nonadversarial conversation among various parties working together facilitates
that outcome.
Other counties have implemented collaborative juvenile courts of varying
structures. The Middle School Education Court (MSEC) in Santa Clara County,
for example, strives “to help foster children attain academic success through

12. Id.
13. Id. at 121.
14. Id. For a study on the transition from foster care into adulthood focusing on a sample of
young people from Iowa, Wisconsin, and Illinois, see Midwest Evaluation of the Adult Functioning of
Former Foster Youth, CHAPINHALL, http://www.chapinhall.org/research/report/midwest-evaluationadult-functioning-former-foster-youth (last visited Mar. 30, 2012). The study found that forty-five
percent of young men and eighteen percent of young women reported that they had been
incarcerated when the study followed up on the participants at age twenty-three or twenty-four. See
MARK E. COURTNEY ET AL., MIDWEST EVALUATION OF THE ADULT FUNCTIONING OF FORMER
FOSTER YOUTH: OUTCOMES AT AGE 23 AND 24, at 7 (2010), available at http://www.chapinhall.org/
sites/default/files/Midwest_Study_ES_Age_23_24.pdf. Participants of the study earned a median
income of $8,000 per year, compared to a median of $18,300 for their peers who were not a part of
the foster care system. Id. at 5.
15. Brenda Gordon, Note, A Criminal’s Justice or a Child’s Injustice? Trends in the Waiver of Juvenile
Court Jurisdiction and the Flaws in the Arizona Response, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 193, 197 (1999).
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appropriate educational placements and support.”16 Various child welfare
advocates collaborate to help the approximately twenty-four youths in this
program.17 Santa Clara County also has a Girls Drug Court, with a treatment
program that serves as an alternative to incarceration.18 San Mateo County has a
delinquency Girls Court, where the treatment program at the detention facility,
known as the Margaret Kemp Camp for girls, provides counseling, speakers, yoga
classes for anger management, and other programs specifically focused on
successfully rehabilitating the girls.19 Alameda County has a treatment program for
girls convicted of prostitution offenses that allows girls to avoid detention at
juvenile hall and instead attend treatment programs while remaining in their
communities.20 This Note focuses on and compares Orange County’s dependency
Boys and Girls Courts and Hawaii’s delinquency Girls Court because they are
gender-segregated court systems rather than gender-segregated detention facilities,
and because they have similar structures despite their differences.
B. Boys and Girls in the Juvenile Justice System
Male delinquents outnumber female delinquents in the juvenile court
system.21 “In 2006, arrests of boys represented more than [seventy percent] of all
juvenile arrests.”22 Even so, the number of girls entering the system over the past
ten years has significantly increased.23 In 1980, girls accounted for twenty percent
of juvenile arrests. That number jumped to twenty-nine percent in 2002 and 2003,
and stayed there in 2006.24 Although the number of female arrests continues to
rise, girls are still considered the “forgotten few” in the juvenile justice system.25 A
limited number of studies focus “specifically on girls’ court processing, and many
important studies do not include girls in their samples or do not analyze the data
separately” from the boys’ data.26
Both boys and girls in the dependency system are often victims of abuse and
neglect, which can potentially lead to delinquency, violence, self-destructive
16. Kristy Luk, New Juvenile Dependency Court Focuses on Foster Youth Education, YOUTH L.
NEWS (Oct.–Dec. 2011), http://www.youthlaw.org/publications/yln/2011/winter_2011_2012/new
_juvenile_dependency_court_focuses_on_foster_youth_education.
17. Id.
18. Carroll, supra note 4.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Anne Bowen Poulin, Female Delinquents: Defining Their Place in the Justice System, 1996 WIS. L.
Rev. 541, 541 (1996).
22. Fact Sheet: Juvenile Delinquency, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, http://aspe.hhs
.gov/hsp/08/boys/FactSheets/jd/report.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2012).
23. Alison S. Burke, Girls and the Juvenile Court: An Historical Examination of the Treatment of Girls,
47 CRIM. L. BULL. 117, 117 (2011).
24. Id. at 117–18.
25. Id. at 118 (quoting Ilene R. Bergsmann, The Forgotten Few: Juvenile Female Offenders, 53 FED.
PROBATION 73 (1989)).
26. Id.
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behaviors, and substance abuse.27 Youths in the dependency system also
“experience emotional trauma resulting from [the] chronic rejection, loss of
affection, [and] betrayal” they have experienced as a result of the neglect they have
suffered.28
Girls are more likely to be arrested for status or moral offenses, a tendency
that juvenile courts, at their inception, were designed to address.29 Status offenses
are offenses related to conduct that would be legal for an adult but illegal for a
child.30 Examples of such conduct are truancy, running away, and possession of
alcohol.31 In the early twentieth century, eighty percent of girls brought into the
juvenile justice system were charged with offenses associated with immorality
rather than criminal offenses.32 Today, girls continue to be arrested for status
offenses at higher rates than boys.33 Females “account for the majority of arrests
for certain types of offenses such as running away—fifty-nine percent—and
prostitution and commercialized vice—sixty-nine percent.”34 The fact that girls are
arrested and jailed for these moral offenses is a problem because the delinquency
system is more punitive now than it was in the past.35 Although girls “are generally
brought into the system for lesser offenses than most male offenders, their case
dispositions are often as severe or more severe than their male counterparts.”36
Generally, the triggering events that lead to boys’ involvement in the juvenile
justice system are different than those affecting girls. This generalization may
highlight “natural” distinctions between boys’ and girls’ delinquency even before
arrest.37 Victimization is a risk factor for boys and girls, but it seems to be a
“stronger predictor among females.”38 Ninety-two percent of girls in the
California juvenile justice system “report some form of emotional, physical, or
sexual abuse.”39 Self-reported abuse is significantly lower in boys, although boys

27. CONDITIONS OF CHILDREN, supra note 9, at 117.
28. Id.
29. Poulin, supra note 22, at 546.
30. Laura A. Barnickol, Note, The Disparate Treatment of Males and Females Within the Juvenile
Justice System, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 429, 430 (2000).
31. Governor’s Juvenile Justice Advisory Comm., At-Risk and Delinquent Girls in the Juvenile
Justice System, WASH. ST. DEP’T SOC. & HEALTH SERVICES 3 (2008), www.dshs.wa.gov/word/ojj/
GirlsPolicyBriefFinalMarch08.doc.
32. Burke, supra note 23, at 119.
33. See Poulin, supra note 21, at 546; Girls and Boys in the Juvenile Justice System: Are There
Differences That Warrant Policy Changes in the Juvenile Justice System?, FUTURE CHILD. (2008), http://www
.princeton.edu/futureofchildren/publications/highlights/18_02_Highlights_08.pdf [hereinafter Girls
and Boys].
34. Girls and Boys, supra note 33.
35. Poulin, supra note 21, at 542.
36. Barnickol, supra note 30, at 446.
37. Governor’s Juvenile Justice Advisory Comm., supra note 31, at 2.
38. Elizabeth Cauffman, Understanding the Female Offender, 18 FUTURE CHILD. 119, 129–30
(2008).
39. Id. at 130.
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may be more likely to underreport.40 Family discord is also a risk factor for both
genders, but “[p]oor emotional ties to family are more strongly associated with
violence in girls than in boys.”41 For both males and females, drug and alcohol
abuse and failure in school can lead to involvement in criminal activity.42
However, as noted by Lorri Caprista, the supervising probation officer in an allgirl San Mateo County detention program, when girls get into trouble with the
law, they tend to blame themselves rather than others.43 As a result, girls are more
likely to engage in self-harm than boys.44
The separation of girls’ and boys’ programs acknowledges that girls generally
react differently than boys do to traumatic events, even when the actual events
may be identical.45 Addressing the differences in the ways girls and boys respond
to the difficult events in their lives is a primary focus of gender-segregated court
programs. The importance of addressing these differences has increased with the
growth in the number of girls in the juvenile justice system.46 In sum, gendersegregated courts arose to provide individual attention to the often distinct needs
of boys and girls because girls have historically received harsher punishments for
status offenses, because girls react differently to external stimuli and tend to enter
the delinquency and dependency systems for different reasons than boys, and
because girls and boys tend to react differently to traumatic events.
C. Orange County’s Dependency Courts
Each of Orange County’s dependency Boys and Girls Courts has about
thirty youths—a miniscule percentage of the total number of youths in the Orange
County dependency system. On average, 3,500 children in Orange County are
removed from abusive home environments each year.47
Judge Carolyn Kirkwood, the presiding judge of the Juvenile Court from
2008 through 2010, found teenage girls to be a population that was both generally
underserved and also particularly at-risk in Orange County.48 Commissioner Jane
Shade hears all Girls Court cases, and every member of the Girls Court staff is
female. The collaborators include the judge, attorneys, court staff, and
representatives from probation, the Department of Education, the Department of
Health, and Court Appointed Special Advocates (CASA).49 The thin line between

40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Carroll, supra note 4.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. About Orangewood Children’s Foundation, ORANGEWOOD CHILD. FOUND., http://www
.orangewoodfoundation.org/about.asp (last visited Mar. 30, 2012).
48. Carroll, supra note 4.
49. CASA volunteers advocate for abused and neglected children in the dependency system.
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the juvenile dependency and delinquency systems is apparent at these meetings;
probation officers often attend because the girls in this dependency court are also
often involved in the delinquency system.
Orange County’s Boys Court program aims to “give the youth most at risk
some dedicated, specialized attention that helps them finish high school, learn life
skills, live in a more stable environment and develop confidence.”50 Judge Maria
Hernandez hears all cases in this court, which has many of the same staff
members as the Girls Court. (Unlike Girls Court, which has an all-female staff,
Boys Court does not have an all-male staff.) Judge Hernandez brings in male law
enforcement officers to act as mentors for the boys.51
Each week, the members of the Girls and Boys Court staff meet to talk in
depth about each juvenile they have on calendar for the week. The juveniles do
not attend these meetings, but the members of the court teams get to know the
children through their discussions at these meetings, through their interactions
with the children in the courtroom, and during other visits the staff members have
with the juveniles. After the team meetings, the juveniles come to court for their
sessions.
The structure of the Orange County Girls and Boys Courts fosters genuine
connections between the court staff and the youths in the programs. At meetings,
the social workers show photos of the girls and boys and tell stories about them.
Whenever one of the youths does well in school or succeeds in some way, the
members of the court staff seem genuinely proud. Conversely, when a juvenile
gets into trouble that leads to a delinquency proceeding, each member of the court
staff seems to feel a heightened duty to help get him or her back on track. These
courts strive to embody the notion of a collaborative effort to help the
participating juvenile; the staff’s dedication to the programs and to the
participating youths is worthy of recognition.
One of the goals of the Orange County Girls and Boys Courts is to expose
the youths to positive experiences. Many of the youths in the program have never
left Orange County and have little conception of what the world beyond their
locale has to offer. Through field trips to the planetarium, the Getty Museum, and
Rogers Gardens, and activities such as rock climbing, surfing, and day hikes to
local wilderness areas, the Orange County Girls and Boys Courts strive to show
the youths in their courts the variety of experiences open to them.

Their role is to help these children navigate through the system and to act as positive role models for
the children they are assigned to. About Us, CASA FOR CHILD., http://www.casaforchildren.org/
site/c.mtJSJ7MPIsE/b.5301303/k.6FB1/About_Us__CASA_for_Children.htm. (last visited Mar. 30,
2012).
50. Don J. DeBenedictis, O.C. to Start Teen Foster Boys’ Court, DAILY J., Aug. 12, 2010, at 4,
available at http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/ocfoster-boyscourt.pdf.
51. Id.
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D. Hawaii Delinquency Court
There are two main differences between the Orange County programs and
the Hawaii program. First, Hawaii has only a Girls Court, with no separate
counterpart for boys. Second, the Orange County programs are dependency
courts, while the Hawaii program is a delinquency court. Like Orange County, the
Hawaii Girls Court has an all-female staff and gender-specific programming. The
programming “seeks to recognize the fundamental differences between male and
female juvenile offenders as well as their different pathways to delinquency . . . .”52
Probation officers in Hawaii’s mainstream system refer girls to the Girls
Court.53 Participation in the Girls Court is voluntary; there are weekly activities
that involve a high level of engagement and commitment not only from the
participating girl, but also from her parent or guardian, as well as program staff. If
either the girl or her family members are not willing to participate in the program,
the mainstream delinquency system remains available as an option.54
The Hawaii Girls Court convenes once every four weeks in an open court
setting, in contrast to the dependency courts’ closed sessions. All of the girls in the
court program, along with their families, attorneys, and probation officers, are
present. The girls are able to learn from each others’ experiences and share with
one another. Unlike Orange County’s dependency courts, where the bulk of these
discussions are held in private, sensitive issues are addressed in a group setting,
with all of the girls present. As discussed in Section II.C.2 of this Note, the
structure of the Hawaii court may make it more difficult to mix boys and girls
than in Orange County’s model.
The Hawaii Girls Court program is structured “to address the unique needs
of girls.”55 There is a focus on building relationships because “relationships are
central in girl[s’] lives and . . . healthy connections are essential to their mental
health and well-being.”56 The program also provides “service opportunities for
girls to foster positive community involvement while instilling value on helping
others.”57 Perhaps most importantly, the program adopts a holistic view,
addressing “the whole girl in the context within which she lives and the influences
that shape her life. This involves examining her physical and emotional/mental
health, educational, and cultural domains.”58 In particular, the Hawaii Girls Court

52. Welcome to Hawaiʻi Girls Court, HAW. GIRLS CT., http://www.girlscourt.org (last visited
Mar. 30, 2012).
53. Telephone Interview with Leah M. Nahale, Program Coordinator, Hawaii Girls Court
(Dec. 29, 2011).
54. Id.
55. Our Mission & Program Values, HAW. GIRLS CT., http://www.girlscourt.org/mission.html
(last visited Mar. 30, 2012).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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addresses trauma treatment, mental health treatment, domestic violence
prevention, teen pregnancy prevention, and substance abuse treatment.59
II. EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS OF GENDER-SEGREGATED COURTS
Segregation by gender is inherently an equal protection issue, which means
such segregation will be legal only if it meets intermediate scrutiny. Section A of
this Part discusses why the existence of gender-segregated courts is an equal
protection issue. Section B discusses the intermediate scrutiny standard applicable
to the equal protection issues raised by gender-segregated courts. After the
framework for the analysis is described, Section C discusses various arguments as
to whether these courts meet equal protection analysis.
A. Maintaining Gender-Segregated Courts Is Inherently an Equal Protection Issue
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment says: “No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”60 In Frontiero v. Richardson, the
Supreme Court explicitly held that dividing girls and boys into separate courts
raises equal protection concerns. The Frontiero Court held that “classifications
based upon sex, like classifications based upon race, alienage, and national origin,
are inherently suspect and must therefore be subjected to close judicial scrutiny.”61
The Court reaffirmed this holding in Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,62
acknowledging that an express separation of the sexes triggers equal protection
analysis. The Court determined that “[b]ecause the challenged policy expressly
discriminate[d] among applicants on the basis of sex, it [was] subject to scrutiny
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”63 Mississippi
University for Women involved a nursing school located at the all-female Mississippi
University for Women.64 A male prospective student sought to enroll in the
program, and although he was fully qualified, he was denied admission solely
because of his gender.65 The school in Mississippi University for Women expressly
discriminated based on gender, as do the gender-segregated juvenile courts
discussed here. Therefore, this practice in the juvenile justice context should
automatically raise an equal protection issue.
The argument against the notion that the separation of individuals by gender
is inherently an equal protection issue arises from the fact that, as a society, we

59. Services & Partnering Agencies, HAW. GIRLS CT., http://www.girlscourt.org/partners.html
(last visited Mar. 30, 2012).
60. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
61. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973) (footnotes omitted).
62. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
63. Id. at 723.
64. Id. at 720.
65. Id. at 720–21.
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tolerate gender segregation in many contexts where we would not tolerate racial
segregation, such as in bathrooms, locker rooms,66 and dressing rooms. This
argument has two weaknesses. First, gender segregation in these contexts is still an
equal protection issue; it is permitted because it arguably meets intermediate
scrutiny.67 There are, however, strong arguments that gender segregation in the
context of bathrooms, locker rooms, and dressing rooms does not always meet
intermediate scrutiny, as in the case of transgendered individuals, who cannot
comfortably use gender-segregated bathrooms.68 The second weakness, relevant in
this situation, is that segregation by gender has different implications in different
contexts. Gender segregation in the context of court programs is different from
gender segregation in locker rooms. There are actual physical and biological
differences between the sexes that give rise to privacy concerns that may justify
segregation of bathrooms and dressing rooms. Separation by sex in any area that
does not involve such privacy concerns, however, such as schools and court
programs, runs a greater risk of being based on factors that may not survive even
deferential levels of scrutiny, such as when based on assumptions of one gender’s
inherent inferiority. Notions of inherent inferiority were the concern with racial
segregation as well. For these reasons, separation on the basis of sex in all
situations is an equal protection issue, and while it may meet intermediate scrutiny
in some contexts, it may not in others.
Further support for treating gender segregation as an equal protection issue
is found in the equal protection analysis of racial segregation. In Johnson v.
California, the Supreme Court considered the California Department of
Corrections’ unwritten policy of segregating prisoners entering prison facilities by
race for up to sixty days.69 The state’s purpose was to prevent violence involving
racial gangs.70 Although the Court left it to the lower courts to determine whether
the state’s policy of segregating based on race was permissible, the Court
determined that all racial classifications must be analyzed using strict scrutiny,

66. Sullivan v. City of Cleveland Heights, 869 F.2d 961, 964 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding that a
young female hockey player on an otherwise all-male team was not denied equal protection, despite
the fact that she was not allowed to change in the team locker room and instead had to change in the
women’s restroom down the hall).
67. See, e.g., Chaney v. Plainfield Healthcare Ctr., 612 F.3d 908, 913 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Just as
the law tolerates same-sex restrooms or same-sex dressing rooms, but not white-only rooms, to
accommodate privacy needs, Title VII allows an employer to respect a preference for same-sex health
providers, but not same-race providers.”); see also Ludke v. Kuhn, 461 F.Supp. 86, 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)
(recognizing protection of the privacy right as an important objective, but in the case of excluding a
reporter from the Yankee locker room, the policy of excluding female sports reporters was not
substantially related to the privacy of players. Thus, the sex segregation of the locker room was
analyzed as an equal protection issue and, in this unique case, did not meet intermediate scrutiny.).
68. See generally Alex More, Note, Coming out of the Water Closet: The Case Against Sex Segregated
Bathrooms, 17 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 297 (2008).
69. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 502 (2005).
70. Id.
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even if they are “benign” classifications.71 Thus, regardless of the context, racial
segregation is an inherent equal protection issue. This is because of the fear that
racial classifications “are motivated by an invidious purpose.”72 Therefore,
pursuant to Johnson v. California, racial separation always requires equal protection
analysis.
In light of Johnson, the separation of boys and girls into different court
programs should be viewed as inherently raising equal protection concerns. Sex,
like race, is an immutable characteristic, and our society has historically
discriminated on the basis of sex. Additionally, like race, sex is often a visible
characteristic. Situations exist, of course, in which a person’s particular race or sex
is not obvious, but they are nevertheless both visible characteristics. The risk of
motivation by an invidious purpose with regard to sex segregation is similar to that
presented in the context of racial segregation; the history of sex discrimination
gives credence to the idea that separation by sex should be considered an inherent
equal protection issue. While the context of segregation of court programs is
different than that of detention facilities—the situation in Johnson—the
comparison is relevant because Johnson declared racial segregation an inherent
equal protection issue regardless of the context.73 The argument here is that
gender segregation should also be viewed as an inherent equal protection issue
regardless of the context.
Even if separation of the genders is not inherently an equal protection issue,
it is nevertheless an equal protection issue in this context because boys and girls
are treated differently as a result of the separation. These differences will be
discussed further in Section C.
B. The Level of Scrutiny for Gender-Based Classifications
In an equal protection analysis, the first step is to identify the government’s
classification and determine how the government draws a distinction among
individuals.74 In this instance, the distinction is based on gender. The second step
of the analysis is to determine the appropriate level of scrutiny.75 For gender
classifications, the appropriate level of scrutiny is intermediate scrutiny.76
When intermediate scrutiny applies, “a law is upheld if it is substantially
related to an important government purpose . . . . The means used need not be
necessary, but must have a ‘substantial relationship’ to the end being sought.”77
The Court in United States v. Virginia reiterated the rule that “[p]arties who seek to

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 505.
Id. at 506.
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 718 (3d ed. 2009).
Id.
Id. at 719.
Id.
Id.
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defend gender-based government action must demonstrate an ‘exceedingly
persuasive justification’ for that action.”78
The government purpose, or justification, “must be genuine, not
hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to litigation. And it must not rely on
overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or preferences of
males and females.”79 In discussions of gender discrimination, often the focus is
on discrimination against women. However, “[t]he fact that the classification
expressly discriminates against men rather than women does not protect it from
scrutiny.”80
Gender segregation may also meet intermediate scrutiny if the segregated
facilities are “separate but substantially equal.” The Supreme Court in United States
v. Virginia used the standard articulated in the lower court’s dissent, namely that an
arrangement “that ‘could survive equal protection scrutiny’” is “single-sex schools
with ‘substantially comparable curricular and extra-curricular programs, funding,
physical plant, administration and support services, . . . faculty[,] and library
resources.’”81 This suggests that two separate gender-segregated programs, one for
boys and the other for girls, could meet intermediate scrutiny if they are
substantially equal.
The doctrine of “separate but equal” arose in the Supreme Court’s equal
protection analysis of racial segregation in schools.82 The Court in Plessy v. Ferguson
expressly approved racial segregation in the education context, stating that “[i]f the
civil and political rights of both races be equal, one cannot be inferior to the other
civilly or politically.”83 Over fifty years later, the Court in Sweatt v. Painter found
that a separate law school for African American students was not “substantially
equal.”84 The Court did not overrule “separate but equal,” but it required that the
two establishments be substantially equal.85 Four years later, the Court famously
held “separate but equal” impermissible with regard to racial segregation in public
schools in Brown v. Board of Education.86
Although the doctrine of “separate but equal” has been overruled in the
context of racial segregation, it continues to be used in the context of gender
segregation. The Supreme Court in United States v. Virginia used the “substantially
equal” language from Sweatt v. Painter and altogether neglected to mention Brown’s

78. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) (citing J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.,
511 U.S. 127, 136–37 (1994), and Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)).
79. Id. at 533.
80. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 279 (1979) (citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 218 (1979)).
81. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 547 n.17 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Virginia, 44
F.3d 1229, 1250 (4th Cir. 1995) (Phillips, J., dissenting)).
82. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1897).
83. Id. at 551–52.
84. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950).
85. Id. at 635.
86. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
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absolute prohibition of racial segregation.87 Because “substantially equal” is an
equal protection analysis for gender-segregated programs, the standard is still
intermediate scrutiny.
As evidenced by the use of the “substantially equal” standard for gender
segregation, once an equal protection issue is raised, the courts view gender
differently than race. This discussion goes beyond the determination of whether
there is an equal protection issue to whether the Equal Protection Clause has been
violated, but it is interesting to compare the analyses for racial and gender
segregation. For example, racial integration facilitates racial equality. With regard
to gender equality, however, some argue that separation facilitates equality by
helping females come out of their shells and by potentially closing the gender
gap.88 In addition, there are actual differences between the genders, both
physiological and psychological.89 As discussed in Section II.C.4, attributes that are
unique to one sex may justify government action that segregates by sex, as long as
the attributes are not based on stereotypes.90
C. Do the Courts at Issue Meet Intermediate Scrutiny?
There may be various government purposes at work in maintaining gender
segregation in collaborative courts. This Section analyzes whether such segregation
is substantially related to such purposes. Subsection 1 discusses remedying past
discrimination as an important purpose for the gender-segregated courts.
Subsection 2 discusses the exclusivity of the programs as an important purpose.
Subsection 3 addresses whether diversity of court programs available can serve as
an important purpose for gender-segregated courts. Subsection 4 discusses
whether addressing the individual needs of the juveniles is an important purpose
substantially related to the gender segregation of these courts, and Subsection 5
analyzes whether the dependency Boys and Girls Courts are “separate but
substantially equal.” Subsection 6 draws conclusions from the analysis, primarily
that Orange County’s dependency courts are most likely to meet the intermediate
scrutiny standard if they ensure their Boys and Girls Courts are substantially equal,
87. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 547 n.17 (1996) (quoting United States v. Virginia,
44 F.3d 1229, 1250 (4th Cir. 1995) (Phillips, J., dissenting) (citing Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 634)).
88. Rebecca A. Kiselewich, Note, In Defense of the 2006 Title IX Regulations for Single-Sex Public
Education: How Separate Can Be Equal, 49 B.C. L. REV. 217, 252 (2008).
89. Id. There is a blurring of the lines between biological and cultural differences between the
sexes because of the cultural aspects of gender. Because this complex issue goes beyond the scope of
this Note, it will not be discussed here. The purpose of this Note is to present the equal protection
arguments as they have been made. For further discussion on this topic, see More, supra note 68, at
301–05; see also Terry S. Kogan, Transsexuals and Critical Gender Theory: The Possibility of a Restroom Labeled
“Other,” 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1223, 1235–47 (1997); see also Andrew Gilden, Toward a More Transformative
Approach: The Limits of Transgender Formal Equality, 23 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 83, 87–92
(2008).
90. Barbara A. Brown et al., The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights
for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 893–900 (1971).
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and that the best argument for the constitutionality of Hawaii’s delinquency Girls
Court is the exclusivity of the benefits afforded to the girls participating in the
court.
1. Remedying Past Discrimination in Juvenile Court Programs
The Supreme Court has allowed disparate treatment of genders when the
purpose behind it is remedial.91 For example, in Califano v. Webster, “the Court
upheld a congressional scheme that used a more favorable formula for women”
than men in calculating social security retirement benefits.92 The Court reasoned
that “[r]eduction of the disparity in economic condition between men and women
caused by the long history of discrimination against women has been recognized
as . . . an important governmental objective.”93
This analysis necessitates a look at the history of discrimination against girls
in the delinquency system, the remedying of which may be an important purpose
substantially related to the establishment of an all-girls court. Due to “the system’s
focus on male offenders, gender bias has been a long-term problem within the
juvenile justice system.”94 As a result “of this gender bias, young delinquent
females are less likely to receive the effective treatment upon which the juvenile
justice system’s parens patriae principle is based.”95 Because society typically views
rebellious behavior among female adolescents as more deviant and less acceptable,
girls are more likely to be arrested and to receive harsher sentences for status
offenses, even though boys commit an equal number of such offenses.96 Research
shows that adolescent female offenders generally receive harsher sentences than
young male offenders receive for the same crimes.97 This is because girls are more
often detained for status offenses, ostensibly in order to protect them.98 Status
offenses are seen as less serious when committed by males, arguably because of
the societal norms that girls will be obedient and boys will inevitably misbehave.99
These societal norms make it less socially acceptable for a girl to act out, so she is
more likely to be punished than a boy who commits the same act.
The juvenile court was originally perceived as an entity charged with
preventing girls from becoming “morally depraved,” which resulted in harsher
sentencing for “moral” crimes.100 Few studies of the delinquency courts focus on

91. David S. Cohen, The Stubborn Persistence of Sex Segregation, 20 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 51,
105 (2011).
92. Id.
93. Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317 (1977).
94. Barnickol, supra note 30, at 441.
95. Id. at 442.
96. Id. at 438.
97. Id. at 446.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Burke, supra note 23, at 120.
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girls’ court processing, and “many important studies do not include girls in their
samples or do not analyze the data separately.”101 Consequently, any changes
made to the delinquency system as a result of these studies likely do not take into
account the needs of females in the system. It is important to note, however, that
this Subsection focuses only on the delinquency system. While the delinquency
and dependency systems are closely related, this discrimination argument would be
difficult to apply to the Orange County Boys and Girls Courts because of the lack
of evidence of past discrimination in the dependency system.
The Supreme Court, “[i]n evaluating other affirmative action programs . . .
has insisted upon a particularized showing of discrimination within the setting or
institution in question, and has rejected generalized statistical data about the
industry-wide discrimination. This requirement applies even under the ‘relaxed’
scrutiny of the intermediate test for gender discrimination,” as in Mississippi
University for Women.102 United States v. Virginia established that a “particularized
showing of disadvantage or exclusion” could justify a “remedial single-sex
program.”103 As articulated in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, the Court has
required “some showing of prior discrimination by the governmental unit
involved before allowing limited use of racial classifications in order to remedy
such discrimination.”104 In Mississippi University for Women, the Court acknowledged
that “[i]n limited circumstances, a gender-based classification favoring one sex can
be justified if it intentionally and directly assists members of the sex that is
disproportionately burdened” by prior discrimination.105 However, “the mere
recitation of a benign, compensatory purpose is not an automatic shield which
protects against any inquiry into the actual purposes underlying a statutory
scheme.”106 In Mississippi University for Women, the school “made no showing that
women lacked opportunities to obtain training in the field of nursing or to attain
positions of leadership in that field.”107 For that reason, the Court did not uphold
the compensatory purpose as a sufficiently important one.
Justifying gender segregation in these collaborative courts on the grounds of
remedying past discrimination would require a particularized showing of
discrimination on the part of the court in question. The delinquency Girls Court
was created due to the influx of girls entering the delinquency system in Hawaii,

101.
102.

Id. at 118.
Galen Sherwin, Single-Sex Schools and the Antisegregation Principle, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 35, 60 (2005).
103. Id. at 59.
104. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986).
105. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 728 (1982) (quoting Weinberger v.
Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 (1975)).
106. Id. (quoting Weinberger, 420 U.S. at 648) (internal quotation marks omitted).
107. Id. at 729.
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not because of any cited discrimination in that system.108 In order for the Girls
Court to assert in court that its separate treatment of girls is justified, it would
need to show that remedying past discrimination (such as harsher sentences for
girls convicted of the same crime as boys)—not a demographic shift like the
increase in girls entering delinquency—is the program’s purpose.
A showing of past discrimination in Orange County’s dependency system
would also be necessary in order to justify the dependency Boys and Girls Courts
on the basis of remedying past discrimination. One way that the Girls Court could
demonstrate discrimination that might then justify remedial action could be a
showing that girls were more often left in large group homes rather than in
placements with foster families because group homes have more strict security
and protect girls from their supposed tendencies to commit immoral acts. In the
context of the Boys Court, past discrimination that may justify the Boys Court
could be, for example, a showing that boys were left in group homes because of a
stereotypical notion that they would not thrive amid the closer relationships
formed in foster homes. Past discrimination of these types or others, if proven,
would justify gender segregation in the Girls and Boys Courts.
2. Exclusivity of Benefits Afforded Each Gender
An argument for the constitutionality of gender-segregated courts is that
certain programs benefitting one gender cannot be effectively provided if the
other gender is present. In United States v. Virginia, the Supreme Court considered
the argument that “[a]lterations to accommodate women would necessarily be
‘radical,’ so ‘drastic,’ . . . as to transform, indeed ‘destroy,’ [the Virginia Military
Institute (VMI)]’s program” and that “[n]either sex would be favored by the
transformation.”109 Virginia argued that “[m]en would be deprived of the unique
opportunity currently available to them; women would not gain that opportunity
because their participation would ‘eliminat[e] the very aspects of [the] program
that distinguish [VMI] from . . . other institutions of higher education in
Virginia.’”110 Despite these arguments, the Court held that the separate male and
female programs violated equal protection.
Similarly, such a justification would likely not be upheld with regard to the
Orange County dependency courts. Each court has a different focus, and boys
and girls have different needs when it comes to their delinquency and dependency
issues. There is sufficient overlap between the two groups, however, that they
could be combined without “eliminat[ing] the very aspects of [the] program that
distinguish”111 Girls Court from Boys Court, and both courts from every other
108. Why have a Girls Court?, HAW. GIRLS CT., http://www.girlscourt.org/faq.html#why. (last
visited Mar. 30, 2012).
109. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 540 (1996).
110. Id.
111. Id.
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court program in the country. Although part of what distinguishes these courts is
their gender-specific nature, the most significant characteristic of both the Boys
and Girls Courts is the individual attention given to the participating youths. For
this reason, the discussions that take place in Girls Court are often similar to those
in Boys Court. These discussions occur in the out-of-court meetings with the Girls
and Boys Court staffs, as well as in the confidential court sessions the youths
attend individually. Thus, the only situations in which boys and girls would
interact are during field trips and group activities. Integrating the Boys and Girls
Courts would involve substantial changes only to the structure of the group
activities. Changes to pre-court meetings would be minor, requiring discussions
about boys and girls in the same meeting. Another change would be the presence
of male staff members in these meetings and in court proceedings that now have
only female staff members. Implementation of this change would be a minor
administrative matter, easily accomplished, although such a change may be
substantial in the eyes of a girl who may be uncomfortable discussing intimate
details of her life with males in the courtroom. For these girls, it may be possible
for all males to leave the courtroom temporarily. Additionally, the fact that all
sensitive discussions about, or with, the youths are in meetings away from other
youths would not change. Thus, any sensitive discussions would not be hindered
by the presence of youths of the opposite gender. The only substantial change
would be that group activities would include members of both genders, which
would give boys and girls opportunities to interact with one another.
In contrast, with regard to the Hawaii delinquency court, gender integration
may actually eliminate the aspects that make the court effective. Part of the Hawaii
court’s focus is to have the girls share their experiences in open court.112 Unlike
the Orange County courts, where each youth is discussed separately and has a
confidential court appearance, the girls in the Hawaii court have court appearances
as a group. This raises issues of how to have open discussions about genderspecific topics if boys and girls are in the conversation together. Youths may be
hesitant to share sensitive information if they feel they will be judged by
individuals of the other gender. For this reason, integrating the Hawaii Girls Court
would eliminate some of the aspects that may make it effective. This is a strong
argument for the constitutionality of the Hawaii Girls Court, but a court would be
unlikely to find the Girls Court constitutional without a similar program for boys.
Thus, the Hawaii court could create a “separate but substantially equal” court for
boys. This concept will be further discussed in Subsection 5. Another possibility
would be to keep the group court appearances gender-segregated while integrating
all of the other activities involved in the court, such as field trips, job fairs, and
community service activities. Integration during these programs may further the

112. What is Girls Court?, HAW. GIRLS CT., http://www.girlscourt.org/aboutus.html. (last
visited Mar. 30, 2012).
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goals of these collaborative courts because it will give boys and girls a chance to
interact with one another.
3. Diversity of Programs Available to Juveniles
Increasing the diversity of available court options is another possible
justification for maintaining these gender-segregated courts. This type of diversity
is different from racial, gender, or religious diversity, and poses an interesting
argument to consider in this context. Most notably, this diversity justification has
been used in the context of gender-segregated schools. The Office for Civil Rights
of the U.S. Department of Education “specifically identifies diversity as one of the
important governmental objectives being served through allowing the option of
single-sex education.”113 The Supreme Court in United States v. Virginia
acknowledged that diversity in the types of educational atmosphere offered can
serve the public good, but decided that it was not a sufficiently important purpose
to meet intermediate scrutiny.114 The Court affirmed that “[a] policy of diversity
which aims to provide an array of educational opportunities, including singlegender institutions, must do more than favor one gender.”115 A justification for
state action “must describe actual state purposes, not rationalizations for actions in
fact differently grounded.”116
The diversity argument is strained in the context of the gender-segregated
juvenile courts because these courts are not just one choice among many. In
Orange County, boys and girls are chosen to participate based on their level of
need for special assistance. They can opt out of the collaborative court, but the
alternative is the mainstream dependency court system. The same is true for the
Hawaii Girls Court.117 In both cases, there is no alternative collaborative court that
is gender-integrated. While the Boys and Girls Courts offer another path for some
youths in the juvenile court system, the argument that this is just one choice
among many choices cannot be sustained in this context. Similarly, in United States
v. Virginia, the diversity justification was not upheld because Virginia failed to
show that VMI was established or maintained with a view to diversifying the
educational opportunities available.118 The same is true here. The availability of
these courts may be a stepping-stone on the way to having a diverse range of court
options available to the youths, but it remains to be seen whether these courts are
the first of many options.

113. Kiselewich, supra note 88, at 241.
114. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 524.
115. Id. at 525 (quoting United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 899 (4th Cir. 1992)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
116. Id. at 535–36.
117. Telephone Interview with Leah M. Nahale, Program Coordinator, Hawaii Girls Court
(Dec. 29, 2011).
118. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 539.
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In order for the diversity argument to be upheld in this context, there would
need to be evidence of an effort to continue to diversify the range of court
programs available in the juvenile justice system. This would show that
establishing diversity in court programs is an actual state purpose, not a
“rationalization[] for [an] action[] in fact differently grounded.”119 Eventually, a
gender-segregated collaborative court would need to be one option among many
that youths could choose from. It would help if several other options were already
available, but as long as there is evidence of a move toward such diversification,
the argument may be offered as the purpose behind creation of these courts. In
Orange County, the creation of an integrated collaborative court program in
addition to the gender-segregated collaborative courts would be a move toward
further diversification of the juvenile justice system. Creating a gender-integrated
collaborative court would be helpful for the success of the diversity argument in
Hawaii as well, but the creation of a program serving the individual needs of male
offenders would be the first step. As highlighted in United States v. Virginia, a policy
of diversity must do more than favor one gender.
4. Individual Needs of the Juveniles
Another purpose of gender-segregated courts is to serve juveniles’ individual
needs. It is unquestionably an important state objective to ensure that youth
services are available where they are needed. To that end, each gender faces issues
that are unique to that gender. While boys and girls may share some of the same
risk factors, such as poverty, child abuse, and living in dangerous neighborhoods,
these risk factors tend to impact boys and girls differently.120 Young female
offenders have higher rates of “‘internalizing’ mental disorders (e.g., depression
and anxiety) while boys have higher rates of ‘externalizing’ disorders (e.g., ADHD,
conduct disorder, and other behavioral problems).”121 Delinquent girls also
“report being exposed to child abuse at a much higher rate than boys.”122 Ninetytwo percent of girls in the California juvenile justice system “report some form of
emotional, physical, or sexual abuse,” whereas some studies report abuse rates for
boys at around twenty-five or thirty percent.123 A potential reason for this
discrepancy is the possibility that boys are less likely to report certain kinds of
abuse.124
Due to the differences between boys and girls, the gender-segregated
dependency courts in Orange County “are meant to be ‘gender-responsive not just

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. at 535–36.
Girls and Boys, supra note 33, at 2–3.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 3.
Cauffman, supra note 38, at 130.
Id.
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gender-specific.’”125 In general, “girls respond well to the relationships they
develop with the female social workers and mentors . . . while boys learn by
doing.”126 The girls’ delinquency court in Hawaii also recognizes that
“[r]elationships are important and fundamental to girls’ lives. Girls need time to
talk, process their feelings and develop healthy relationships of trust as well as
interdependence with other females.”127
While these differences between boys and girls are important, it is difficult to
distinguish the legitimate use of these differences from an impermissible reliance
on stereotypes. A government action may not “ignore individual characteristics
found in both sexes in favor of an average based on one sex.”128 In other words,
in order for the government to take into account gender-based characteristics in
legislation or programs, the characteristics must be “found in all (or some) women
but no men, or in all (or some) men but no women.”129 Undoubtedly, boys and
girls have biological differences, such as the marked effect of testosterone on the
male brain.130 It does not follow, however, that these biological differences are
exclusively found in only one sex. “Exposure to high levels of testosterone before
birth . . . has been linked with aggressive behavior in both males and females.”131
The distinctions between boys and girls offered as justifications for their
segregation, such as their distinct tendencies toward mental disorders, or their
varying needs for interpersonal relationships, are not characteristics entirely unique
to one sex. “Normative males and females tend to exhibit asymmetric frontal
brain activation, with boys having greater right frontal activation and girls having
greater left frontal activation.”132 While this is evidence that a typical male brain
works differently than a typical female brain, not all males and females have brains
that function in the characteristic way. Antisocial females tend to exhibit more
right frontal activation, and consequently do not often “exhibit the enhanced
verbal abilities or emotion regulation associated with dominance of the left
hemisphere, as is more commonly observed in normative girls.”133 This potential
for differences in brain function between and among the sexes blurs the lines of
what is “typical” behavior for each sex. In fact, “so far as appears, it is only
physical characteristics which can be said with any assurance to be unique to one

125. DeBenedictis, supra note 50.
126. Id.; see Kiselewich, supra note 88, at 229–30.
127. Activities and Community Service, HAW. GIRLS CT., http://www.girlscourt.org/activities
.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2012).
128. Brown et al., supra note 90, at 893.
129. Id.
130. Kiselewich, supra note 88, at 229–30.
131. Cauffman, supra note 38, at 129.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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sex. So-called ‘secondary’ biological characteristics and cultural characteristics are
found to some degree in both sexes.”134
Nevertheless, there is a possibility that these gender-segregated courts could
reduce gender stereotypes. To relate the issue to schools, “[i]n coed schools, it is
often assumed that interests and talents are gendered.”135 Research shows that
girls in coeducational settings are “more likely to hide their intelligence, lack selfconfidence, and shy away from ‘male’ subjects like math and science.”136 Boys also
struggle in coeducational settings, “especially in areas such as reading and writing,
where studies show that girls tend to outperform them.”137 Boys and girls seem to
avoid subjects stereotypically associated with the opposite gender when they are in
a coeducational setting. This may also apply in the Orange County Boys and Girls
Court setting when the youths attend job fairs or visit universities. If girls and
boys were able to participate in these activities separately, possibly they would be
more open-minded to hearing and inquiring about the various opportunities
available to them. This is a minor exception, however, to the general assertion that
integration of the Boys and Girls Court programs would be beneficial for boys
and girls. Certain events could possibly be segregated, but the programs as a whole
would be integrated. This structure would allow boys and girls to interact in
positive settings, which would help with their socialization skills.
It is difficult to create a program designed around the differences between
genders when there are some boys who have a greater need for the kinds of
interpersonal relationships sought by girls, some boys who have internalizing
disorders, and some girls who learn by doing rather than by cultivating
relationships. A program focusing only on the general tendencies of the genders
may not adequately serve a boy or girl who does not fit that general pattern. A
program that recognizes these general differences between the genders and
counsels youths with these tendencies in mind, but has the ability to recognize
other tendencies, would better serve each individual juvenile. Further, a program
that offers many programs to both boys and girls would give the youths the ability
to pick the program that best serves their own particular interests and needs. For
example, it would give a boy the opportunity to cultivate relationships and a girl
the chance to learn by doing.
These considerations are true both for dependency and for delinquency. On
the dependency side, Orange County already has a Girls and Boys Court, but these
courts should be integrated. On the delinquency side, Hawaii has only a Girls

134. Brown et al., supra note 90, at 893.
135. Lea Hubbard & Amanda Datnow, Do Single-Sex Schools Improve the Education of Low-Income
and Minority Students? An Investigation of California’s Public Single-Gender Academies, 36 ANTHROPOLOGY &
EDUC. Q. 115, 123 (2005).
136. Kiselewich, supra note 88, 229–30.
137. Id.
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Court, so the need is especially present for an integrated court, or a substantially
equal Boys Court, that takes into account the special needs of both boys and girls.
In sum, programs should take into account the differences between boys and
girls, as these differences exist and have a real impact on the lives of these
juveniles. It is important also to recognize, however, that not every person fits into
the typical gender roles, so programs that focus entirely on the traits that are
generally true for each sex may not adequately serve those who do not fit
traditional gender roles. An ideal program would be one where the staff members
have gender-responsive training for both male and female issues and actually
interact with both boys and girls. This way, staff members would have the
resources to respond to juveniles who do not fit the traditional roles.
5. “Separate but Substantially Equal”
The above discussions lead to the question of whether the creation of paired
but separate boys’ and girls’ courts is less constitutionally objectionable than the
creation of either a boys’ or a girls’ court alone. The answer is likely yes, as long as
the separate programs are “substantially equal.”138 As mentioned in Section II.B,
the Supreme Court in United States v. Virginia acknowledged that “single-sex
schools with ‘substantially comparable curricular and extra-curricular programs,
funding, physical plant, administration and support services, . . . faculty[,] and
library resources’” could survive equal protection scrutiny.139 Thus, two separate
gender-segregated programs will likely meet intermediate scrutiny if they are
substantially equal.
An important counterargument is that the separation of the genders runs the
risk of devolving into gender stereotypes, such as the assumptions that all girls
thrive on relationships and that all boys prefer to do physical activities. To the
extent that the Orange County and Hawaii collaborative courts are dominated by
programs driven by stereotypical notions of boys and girls, separate may never
truly be equal, nor even “substantially equal” as the law requires. If the Girls Court
offers programming that some of the boys would benefit from but are not getting,
or vice versa, some youths are deprived of what they truly need because their
needs do not fall under common ideas of what each gender requires. It might be
possible to avoid this kind of situation if each juvenile receives sufficient
individual attention. In the case of the Orange County collaborative dependency
courts, enough individual attention is given to each juvenile so that the court staff
can recognize his or her individual needs. Because of this, separate may be capable
of being equal in some circumstances. Assuming that “substantially equal” allows

138. See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515,
547 n.17 (1996).
139. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 547 n.17 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Virginia, 44
F.3d 1229, 1250 (4th Cir. 1995) (Phillips, J., dissenting)).
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for a certain level of inequality, this is a meaningful guideline for the
constitutionality of these courts.
As currently constituted, the collaborative court programs offered for boys
and girls in both the delinquency and the dependency contexts are not
substantially equal. In the case of Orange County’s two separate dependency court
programs for the boys and the girls, this failing is related to the courts’ different
foci. For example, Boys Court focuses more on gang violence and less on teenage
parenting, whereas Girls Court is the opposite. Gang violence, however, is also an
important issue in girls’ lives; anywhere from eight to thirty-eight percent of gang
members are female.140 Also, teen parenting is important for boys to learn about,
as boys become parents too. If, as mentioned above, sufficient individual attention
is given to each juvenile so that the court staff recognizes any unique needs, this
problem could be substantially avoided.
A more important difference between the two courts is that girls have all
same-sex role models, whereas boys do not. All members of the Girls Court are
female, including the judge, a feature that the Girls Court staff members are very
proud of.141 In the Boys Court, however, the judge and many of the attorneys are
female. Some may argue that having a choice between male and female role
models is more beneficial, so girls are actually at a disadvantage by having samesex role models. However, the relevant inquiry is not which gender is at an
advantage, but rather whether the boys and girls are treated differently. Regardless
of which role model structure is better, the courts are not substantially equal.
The situation in Orange County is directly comparable to one the Supreme
Court considered in United States v. Virginia.142 The Virginia Military Institute
(VMI) was an all-male military academy that used specific types of “adversative”
instruction.143 In response to litigation that originated with a complaint from a
high school female seeking to gain admission to VMI, Virginia created the allfemale Virginia Women’s Institute for Leadership (VWIL).144 The Court analyzed
the two programs and determined that the men’s and women’s programs were not
substantially equal and the segregation was therefore unconstitutional.145
The Hawaii delinquency Girls Court clearly does not meet the separate but
substantially equal standard. Boys and girls are obviously treated differently in this
setting because boys do not have a court process tailored to their specific needs in
the way that girls do. While the juvenile justice system has historically focused on
140. Joan Moore & John Hagedorn, Female Gangs: A Focus on Research, JUV. JUST. BULL. (U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Rockville, MD), Mar. 2001,
available at http://www.west.asu.edu/ckatz/gangclass/Section_1/female.pdf.
141. Carroll, supra note 4; see also Welcome to Hawaiʻi Girls Court, HAW. GIRLS CT., http://
www.girlscourt.org (last visited Mar. 30, 2012).
142. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 520.
143. Id. at 515.
144. Id. at 526.
145. Id. at 534, 547 n.17.
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boys in general,146 boys do not have the same gender-responsive and
individualized programming as girls do in Hawaii’s delinquency system. Arguably,
the fact that the delinquency system was traditionally geared toward boys has
created resentment toward boys as the “favored” ones and has led to increased
focus on the girls and less focus on addressing boys’ issues. Christina Hoff
Sommers, a former philosophy professor well-known for her critique of late
twentieth-century feminism,147 points out that in society, “boys are resented, being
seen both as the unfairly privileged gender and as obstacles on the path to gender
justice for girls.”148 Boys are not, however, privileged in the current system; society
has changed in the century since the creation of the juvenile justice system,149 and
it follows that the issues boys face in society have also changed. This creation of
an all-female court with no counterpart for males is similar to the facts of
Mississippi University for Women, which involved an all-female nursing program with
no male equivalent.150 That program was deemed unconstitutional in violation of
equal protection, even though males could audit courses at Mississippi University
for Women or go to a different coeducational school to obtain nursing training.151
6. Summary—An Overall Look at Whether the Delinquency or Dependency Courts Meet
Intermediate Scrutiny
The best argument for the constitutionality of Orange County’s dependency
Boys and Girls Courts is that they are separate but substantially equal. Presently,
they do not meet this standard, primarily because the Girls Court has an all-female
staff, whereas the Boys Court has a staff of men and women. Regardless of the
good intentions that undoubtedly underlie the decision to structure the courts in
this way, it cannot be considered equal to give same-sex role models to one group
and not to the other. However, the other aspects of the courts are substantially
equal. The structures of the programs are fundamentally the same, and many of
the women on the Girls Court staff are also on the Boys Court staff. The
programs have similar goals and implement them in similar ways. Each court is
focused on achieving the best outcomes for the juvenile participants. Thus, in
order to meet the separate but substantially equal standard, the Orange County
Superior Court need only implement the same structure for its staffs, whether it
chooses a same-sex model or a mixed-sex model. The decision to choose a
structure involving an all-male staff for Boys Court and an all-female staff for
Girls Court, however, will depend on the constitutionality of assigning staff
146. Barnickol, supra note 30, at 441.
147. Biography of Christina Hoff Sommers, AM. ENTERPRISE INST. PUB. POL’Y RES., http://www
.aei.org/scholar/56 (last visited Mar. 30, 2012).
148. CHRISTINA HOFF SOMMERS, THE WAR AGAINST BOYS 23 (2000).
149. Burke, supra note 23, at 119 (“The first juvenile court was established in 1899 in Cook
County, Illinois.”).
150. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 720 (1982).
151. Id. at 719, 721, 723–24 n.8.
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members to the courts on the basis of gender. This discussion is fleshed out below
in Part III.
The argument with the greatest likelihood of success for the constitutionality
of Hawaii’s delinquency Girls Court involves the exclusivity of the benefits
afforded to the girls in the program. Exclusivity acts as a justification for the
court’s segregation only if the benefits afforded the girls could not be provided if
boys were present, which is arguably the case. Part of the court’s focus is to foster
open discussions about gender-specific topics in court. Girls are expected to share
personal information in these group settings, and they would arguably feel
uncomfortable doing so if boys were present. For this reason, a strong argument
can be made that introducing boys into this program would eliminate the elements
of the program that are beneficial to the girls. If this does not serve to justify
maintaining an all-girls court with no counterpart for boys, Hawaii Court Judiciary
could look into creating a separate but substantially equal program for boys, which
would put Hawaii’s program on the same constitutional footing as the Orange
County dependency courts.
The other cited purposes, such as concern for the individual needs of the
juveniles, remedying past discrimination, and diversity of court programs are likely
not going to be as successful for establishing the constitutionality of either court.
Remedying past discrimination and diversity of court programs are compelling
reasons for maintaining Girls and Boys Courts, but they are not strong enough to
withstand intermediate scrutiny in this context. Each court is focused on
addressing the individual needs of the juveniles, which is arguably more effectively
done if the genders are segregated because of the gender-focused nature of the
guidance given. However, because of the fact that the individual needs of each
juvenile do not necessarily map onto the trends for his or her particular gender,
the division may be based more on stereotypes than actual differences between
the genders. When a particular juvenile has needs different from those of her
peers, these courts will ensure that her needs are addressed, because the courts’
goal is to serve each juvenile. Thus, catering to the individual needs of the
juveniles is ultimately served by the small, collaborative nature of these courts,
rather than the gender segregation. Consequently, this important purpose is not
substantially related to the gender segregation.
Ultimately, a court may deem these gender-segregated collaborative courts
constitutional under the theories described above. If Orange County implements
the same staff structure in its Boys and Girls Courts, the courts may well be
deemed separate but substantially equal. If a court determines that the Hawaii
program will be less effective if integrated, it may be constitutional without the
establishment of a substantially equal boys’ program. If not, Hawaii could consider
establishing a boys’ court, which could satisfy the separate but substantially equal
standard.
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III. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION IN THE GENDER-SEGREGATED COURTS
Due to the fact that both of the Girls Courts discussed in this Note employ
all-female staffs, another significant issue raised by these courts is whether they
discriminate in employment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 or the Equal Protection Clause, both of which forbid discrimination on the
basis of gender in hiring and job assignment.152 Because courts are government
employers, equal protection applies in addition to Title VII. The analyses are
closely related, and the two claims are often brought together.153 They are
discussed in turn.
A. Title VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes clear that it is an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to (1) “fail or refuse to hire or to discharge
any individual” or (2) “to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants
for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual
of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee” on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.154 It shall
not, however, be
an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ
employees . . . on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those
certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide
occupational qualification [(BFOQ)] reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of that particular business or enterprise.155
While the BFOQ exception applies explicitly only to hiring and firing, “its
operation also implicitly applies to employment opportunities. Thus, if an
employer restricted the activities of an employee because the same was ‘necessary
to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise,’ then the
employer would be relieved of his statutory obligations under the act.”156
In the case of the Girls Courts, explicit gender discrimination occurs in the
assignment of job opportunities rather than in hiring. Members of the Girls
Courts’ staffs are not hired solely for the purposes of serving on the Girls Courts.
The attorneys appear in the mainstream courts and the judges hear mainstream
court cases. The social workers and probation officers work on many cases
152. See generally Daniel M. Le Vay, Annotation, Sex Discrimination in Job Assignment or Transfer as
Violation of Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e et seq.), 123 A.L.R. Fed. 1 (1995).
153. See 1 SUSAN M. OMILIAN & JEAN P. KAMP, SEX-BASED EMP. DISCRIMINATION § 2:1
(2011).
154. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)–(2) (2006).
155. Id. § 2000e-2(e)(1).
156. Cianciolo v. Members of City Council, 376 F.Supp. 719, 722 (E.D. Tenn. 1974); see also
Reed v. Cnty. of Casey, 184 F.3d 597, 599 (6th Cir. 1999) (allowing a BFOQ defense when employer
assigned a particular shift on the basis of gender and stating, “facial gender-based discrimination is
permitted if gender” is a BFOQ).
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outside of the Girls Courts. The Orange County Superior Court and the Hawaii
State Judiciary employ court staff. Thus, individuals are not explicitly hired for the
purpose of working solely in the Girls Courts, but rather gender is considered in
job assignment. There are, however, questions regarding whether maintaining a
Girls Court means the employer must effectively hire more women staff because
their services are in greater demand. Consequently, it is important to think not
only about discriminatory job assignment in this situation, but also the possibility
of discriminatory hiring.
The BFOQ exception is interpreted narrowly.157 The Supreme Court has
read the “provision to mean that discrimination is permissible only if those aspects
of a job that allegedly require discrimination fall within the ‘essence’ of the
particular business.”158 Another articulation of the Court’s interpretation is “that
sex discrimination ‘is valid only when the essence of the business operation would
be undermined’ if the business eliminated its discriminatory policy.”159 A BFOQ
may not be premised on “stereotyped characterizations of the sexes.”160
The first step in determining whether gender qualifies as a BFOQ is to
determine the “essence” of the business.161 The “essence” of the courts’ business
is to address the needs of and rehabilitate youths in the dependency and
delinquency systems. In the Girls Courts, role modeling is considered a very
important aspect of the programs. In order to determine whether gender is a
BFOQ in this instance, it is necessary to examine the treatment of gender as a
BFOQ in other businesses focused on rehabilitation, counseling, and role
modeling.
Several courts have examined whether role modeling can justify gender as a
BFOQ in the context of role modeling and rehabilitation. The only cases that
found rehabilitation or role modeling alone as a justification for gender as a
BFOQ were those involving detention facilities.162 Because of the substantial
deference to detention facilities,163 the standard is less stringent regarding what
satisfies the requirement for BFOQ. Other cases that determined role modeling or
rehabilitation to be a justification for gender as a BFOQ generally involved
situations where an individual’s privacy interests were also at play. In Healey v.

157. Healey v. Southwood Psychiatric Hosp., 78 F.3d 128, 132 (3d. Cir. 1996).
158. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace and
Agr. Implement Workers of America, UAW v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 201 (1991)).
159. Healey, 78 F.3d at 132 (quoting Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332 (1977)).
160. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 333.
161. Torres v. Wis. Dep’t of Health and Soc. Servs., 859 F.2d 1523, 1528 (7th Cir. 1988).
162. Id. at 1524 (reversing the district court’s decision that rehabilitation in a detention facility
alone cannot be a justification for a BFOQ).
163. Id. at 1531 (acknowledging that judgments of penal administrators “are entitled to
substantial weight when they are the product of a reasoned decision-making process, based on
available information and experience.”); Henry v. Milwaukee Cnty., 539 F.3d 573, 580 (7th Cir. 2008)
(citing Torres with approval but noting this discretion is not unlimited).
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Southwood Psychiatric Hospital, the Third Circuit examined the essence of a
psychiatric hospital’s business to hold that gender was a BFOQ in that context.
The court found the essence of Southwood’s business to consist of treating
“emotionally disturbed and sexually abused adolescents and children.”164 The
court recognized that “‘[r]ole modeling,’ including parental role modeling, is an
important element of the staff’s job, and a male is better able to serve as a male
role model than a female and vice versa.”165 The essence of the Hospital’s
business in that case is very similar to the Girls Courts and Boys Court in that they
all give guidance to adolescents with emotional issues, many of whom have been
sexually abused. While the court in Healey recognized role modeling as an
important element of that function, it treated role modeling as important for both
males and females. For that reason, Healey does not directly map on to the Girls
Courts and Boys Court, where same-sex role modeling is only emphasized for
females. Healey suggests that gender may not be upheld as a BFOQ on the basis of
role modeling unless role modeling is the essence of the business for both sexes.
The Healey court also discussed the role that staff play in the rehabilitation of
children and emphasized that, “[a] balanced staff is . . . necessary because children
who have been sexually abused will disclose their problems more easily to a
member of a certain sex, depending on their sex and the sex of the abuser.”166
This argument works against maintaining an all-female staff because some of the
girls may have suffered abuse by a female, in which case there would be only
female staff members to turn to. In fact, statistics show that ninety percent of
child sexual abuse is committed by males,167 leaving a ten percent chance that a
female will be abused by another female. This statistic also counsels against having
an all-male staff for boys, because they are also more likely to be abused by a male.
Thus, the Healey court’s emphasis on a balanced staff and the importance of role
modeling for both boys and girls indicates that Boys and Girls Courts should both
have male and female staff members. Taking into consideration the argument that
victims of sexual abuse may relate better with members of their own gender—for
instance, because a victim may feel more comfortable talking about such things
with someone who understands his or her perspective—a meaningful solution
would still retain the possibility of same-gender interaction, while not requiring it
in all cases.
Healey also discusses privacy issues related to hygiene, sexuality, and other
concerns of adolescent hospital patients.168 Child patients often must be

164. Healey, 78 F.3d at 132.
165. Id. at 133.
166. Id.
167. David Finkelhor, Current Information on the Scope and Nature of Child Sexual Abuse, 18
FUTURE CHILD., 31, 31 (1994).
168. Healey, 78 F.3d at 133.

UCILR V2I2 Assembled v4 (Do Not Delete)

2012]

A NEW APPROACH TO JUVENILE JUSTICE

7/14/2012 2:14 PM

803

accompanied to the restroom, implicating clear privacy considerations.169 The
court considered these privacy elements of the business along with the therapeutic
elements and found gender to be a BFOQ under the totality of the
circumstances.170 Other cases upholding privacy concerns in support of a BFOQ
arise in the context of businesses that similarly involve the housing of patients and
physical contact with people in treatment. For example, privacy concerns can
justify a gender-specific BFOQ for the personal hygiene care of mental health
patients171 and the care of retirement home patients.172 Nursing care of obstetrics
patients also raises privacy concerns because of the intimate nature of the
interaction between nurse and patient.173
The court in City of Philadelphia v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission
found therapeutic purposes, where paired with privacy issues, to satisfy the BFOQ
requirement.174 There, staff of a youth study center served as counselors for
youths who had emotional and social concerns.175 In addition, the staff was
required to perform physical body checks and observe the youths taking
showers.176 In yet another case, Jatczak v. Ochburg, the District Court of Michigan
considered role modeling as a justification for gender as a BFOQ in the context of
a childcare worker position that required teaching work skills and professional
behavior.177 The court compared the job to counseling the mentally handicapped,
discussing a case where the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission found
gender as a BFOQ because the counselors held sex education and individual
counseling sessions divided by gender.178 These counselors also helped clients
with toilet training and dressing and served as role models.179 The Jatczak court
distinguished the situation before it by noting that counseling and therapy were
not provided by the childcare worker, and that there was no intimate body contact
between the childcare worker and the clients.180 Again, role modeling and
counseling were considered along with physical privacy concerns, and the Jatczak

169. Id.
170. Id. at 134 (“We conclude that due to both therapeutic and privacy concerns, Southwood is
an institution in which the sexual characteristics of the employee are crucial to the successful
performance of the job of child care specialist.”) (emphasis added).
171. Local 567 Am. Fed. v. Michigan Council 25, 635 F. Supp 1010, 1013 (E.D. Mich. 1986).
172. Fesel v. Masonic Home of Del., Inc., 447 F. Supp. 1346, 1353 (D. Del. 1978), aff’’d mem.,
591 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir. 1979).
173. Backus v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 510 F. Supp. 1191, 1193 (E.D. Ark. 1981) (“There are few
duties which a registered nurse can perform in relation to an obstetrical patient which are not
sensitive or intimate.”), vacated as moot, 671 F.2d 1100 (8th Cir. 1982).
174. Philadelphia v. Pa. Human Relations Comm’n, 300 A.2d 97, 102–03 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1973).
175. Id. at 103.
176. Id. at 101.
177. Jatczak v. Ochburg, 540 F. Supp. 698, 704 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
178. Id. at 704 n.4.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 704.
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court found no BFOQ, partly because the privacy concerns were not involved. As
these courts demonstrate, we must look at whether there are privacy
considerations implicated in the Girls Courts.
Because the Girls Courts and Boys Court do not involve the housing of, or
physical contact with, the youths, it is unlikely that privacy concerns would
support gender as a BFOQ. While some of the girls involved in the Hawaii Girls
Court are housed in juvenile detention facilities, the court process itself does not
involve housing. Other than the sensitive issues discussed with the girls during
court proceedings, there are few, if any, privacy concerns to consider. The privacy
concerns that have supported gender as a BFOQ involve actual physical issues,
generally with personal hygiene in situations where a person is housed in a
facility.181
An argument can, however, be made that privacy concerns are at play in the
Boys and Girls Courts even if housing and physical contact are not involved.
Many of the girls in delinquency and dependency proceedings have suffered some
form of abuse,182 and part of the mission of the Girls Courts is to help rehabilitate
these girls. While discussions of abuse do not involve physical contact, which is
present in most cases where the Court finds a privacy concern, one could make
the argument that the discussions necessary for rehabilitation after abuse,
especially sexual abuse, are so personal and intimate that they deserve privacy
protection. Sensitive issues arise during these interactions, and girls will arguably
only feel comfortable in a rehabilitative setting if surrounded by women. Also, a
girl’s sexual abuser is significantly more likely to be male,183 in which case she will
very likely feel more comfortable telling a female her most intimate feelings about
the situation. Further, the fact that boys experience sexual abuse at lower rates
than girls184 arguably supports maintaining same-gender staffs for girls only. If
sexual abuse creates a need to talk to members of the same gender, and if boys
experience less sexual abuse, boys may have less of a need to interact only with
male staff.
While these arguments are persuasive, it is not clear that they justify gender
as a BFOQ. First, courts seem to view privacy as a justification for gender as a
BFOQ only when physical issues are involved,185 so rehabilitation or role

181. Healey v. Southwood Psychiatric Hosp., 78 F.3d 128, 133–34 (3rd Cir. 1996); see also
Fesel v. Masonic Home of Del., Inc., 447 F.Supp. 1346, 1353 (D. Del. 1978), aff’d mem., 591 F.2d 1334
(3d Cir. 1979). See generally Local 567 Am. Fed. v. Michigan Council 25, 635 F. Supp 1010 (E.D. Mich.
1986).
182. Carroll, supra note 4; Governor’s Juvenile Justice Advisory Comm., supra note 31, at 3
(“A national study found that 92 percent of incarcerated girls have experienced one or more forms of
physical, sexual or emotional abuse before entering the juvenile justice system.”).
183. Finkelhor, supra note 167, at 31 (ninety percent of child sexual abuse is committed by
males).
184. Governor’s Juvenile Justice Advisory Comm., supra note 31, at 2; Carroll, supra note 4.
185. Healey, 78 F.3d at 133–34; see also Fesel v. Masonic Home of Del., Inc., 447 F. Supp.
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modeling will not likely justify gender as a BFOQ unless physical privacy issues
are present. Second, even if physical privacy were not necessary for role modeling
or rehabilitation to justify gender as a BFOQ, it may not apply to all staff
members. Gender may be a BFOQ for a girl’s therapist, lawyer, or social worker
because those are the people with whom she discusses her most intimate
thoughts. Other members of the court staff, however, are not generally involved
as closely in the discussions with the girls, so the argument that they must be
female is not as strong. For this reason, gender may be a BFOQ for particular
individuals but perhaps not for the entire Girls Court staff.
B. Equal Protection
Equal protection analysis of potential gender discrimination in employment
is similar to the Title VII analysis. As stated by the Supreme Court in Dothard v.
Rawlinson, “[i]n the case of a state employer, the [BFOQ] exception would have to
be interpreted at the very least so as to conform to the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.”186 This does not mean “that the Equal Protection
Clause requires more rigorous scrutiny of a State’s sexually discriminatory
employment policy than does Title VII.”187 Thus, many of the same
considerations relevant in Title VII considerations directly parallel the equal
protection analysis, and the standard for the two is the same.
To make a claim of employment discrimination under the Equal Protection
Clause, “the plaintiff must prove that she suffered purposeful or intentional
discrimination on the basis of gender.”188 Such discrimination will be tolerated
only if it is substantially related to an important government purpose.
As recognized in Schlesinger v. Ballard,189 affirmative action considerations may
be important enough purposes to justify employment discrimination against
males.190 However, this would require a showing of past discrimination against
women in employment in the juvenile courts.191 Even if such discrimination did
exist, these all-female staffs are not hired for the purpose of remedying past
discrimination, but rather for role modeling and other such purposes. An

1346, 1353 (D. Del. 1978), aff’’d mem., 591 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir. 1979). See generally Local 567, 635 F.
Supp. 1010.
186. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 n.20 (1977).
187. Id.
188. Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 118 (2d Cir. 2004).
189. Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975) (“[T]he different treatment of men and
women naval officers under §§ 6382 and 6401 reflects, not archaic and overbroad generalizations, but,
instead, the demonstrable fact that male and female line officers in the Navy are not similarly situated
with respect to opportunities for professional service.”).
190. 1 SUSAN OMILIAN & JEAN KAMP, SEX-BASED EMP. DISCRIMINATION § 2:1 (2011).
191. Schlesinger, 419 U.S. at 506–07 (distinguishing Frontiero v. Richardson and Reed v. Reed, cases
in which genders were treated differently because of administrative convenience rather than the fact
men and women were dissimilarly situated).
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important purpose in equal protection analysis must be the government’s actual
purpose, not a rationalization for an action “in fact differently grounded.”192
Many of the same considerations for the Title VII BFOQ analysis apply
here. For example, role modeling, discussed in the Title VII analysis as part of the
essence of the Girls Courts, is an important purpose for equal protection analysis.
Hiring only females for these positions, however, is likely not substantially related
to that purpose. As discussed in the Title VII analysis, girls would benefit from
having both male and female role models, especially if they suffered abuse by a
female.193 The fact that boys do not have all-male role models in Boys Court also
arguably weakens this argument because if same-sex role modeling is an important
government purpose, it should be viewed as such for both boys and girls in order
for it to be seriously considered. One could challenge this by saying that girls
respond more to the relationships they develop with their same-sex social workers
and mentors than do boys, so it is not as important for boys to have same-sex role
models.194 While this may be true, such an argument runs the risk of employing
stereotypes, which the Supreme Court is particularly concerned about.195
Rehabilitation is another important purpose that may ground the decision to
maintain an all-female staff. Sensitive issues are discussed with the girls, and it is
arguably important for them to be surrounded by females with whom they feel
comfortable discussing the struggles they go through. But some girls may feel
more comfortable talking to males about certain concerns, which limits the import
of this argument. For example, if a girl has had a volatile relationship with her
mother and was verbally attacked whenever she talked about boys, she may be
more inclined to talk to a male about concerns she has about the opposite sex.
Another girl may be more inclined to open up to a male if she has been sexually
abused by a female. Thus, while creating the best possible environment for
rehabilitation of the girls in Girls Court is an important purpose, it is arguably not
substantially related to maintaining completely gender-segregated staffs. In
addition, as indicated in the Title VII context, role modeling and rehabilitation
likely cannot stand alone to justify a BFOQ, which means they likely are not
important purposes that will satisfy intermediate scrutiny.196

192. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 536 (1996) (“In cases of this genre, our precedent
instructs that benign justifications proffered in defense of categorical exclusions will not be accepted
automatically; a tenable justification must describe actual state purposes, not rationalizations for
actions in fact differently grounded.”).
193. Healey v. Southwood Psychiatric Hosp., 78 F.3d 128, 133 (3d Cir. 1996).
194. DeBenedictis, supra note 50.
195. Cohen, supra note 91, at 105 (“Most commentators who have studied the Court’s
jurisprudence with respect to sex have similarly concluded that the Court is most concerned with ‘the
wrong of stereotyping.’”).
196. See Healey, 78 F.3d at 133; see also Jatczak v. Ochburg, 540 F. Supp. 698, 704 (E.D.C.
Mich. 1982); Philadelphia v. Pa. Human Relations Comm’n, 300 A.2d 97, 103–04 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1973).
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C. Employment Discrimination Conclusions
While the creators and members of the Girls Courts’ staffs strongly believe
in the benefits of an all-female staff for girls, their stated purposes of role
modeling and effective counseling are not likely to stand up to Title VII or equal
protection scrutiny. The lack of same-sex role modeling for boys, together with
the notion that a same-sex staff may not be beneficial at all if a juvenile would
benefit from a mentor of the opposite sex, cut against role modeling as a BFOQ
or important purpose. In addition, the fact that courts have not upheld counseling
or therapeutic concerns alone as justifications for gender as a BFOQ in the Title
VII context indicate that these concerns would likely not be upheld as important
purposes in an equal protection analysis. Thus, the assignment of only females to
positions in the Girls Courts likely violates Title VII’s prohibition against gender
discrimination in hiring and job assignment. For this reason, if Orange County
decides to make changes in order to make the Boys and Girls Courts substantially
equal, one of the first steps it should take is to establish mixed-gendered staffs for
both of the courts. The Hawaii Girls Court should also consider hiring both male
and female staff members for its court.
CONCLUSION
Organizers and supporters of the Girls and Boys Courts celebrate their
alternative approach to the court process, defined, as they see it, primarily by the
courts’ same-sex nature. The most important factor to the success of these courts,
however, is the sincerity of those involved and their desire to improve the lives of
the youths in their courts. This desire has led to the creation of programs that
allow for attention to the specific needs of each juvenile involved in the courts. It
is important to acknowledge the effectiveness of these programs and recognize
that their success is due not to their gender segregation, but rather to their
creation and operation with the goal of providing the best possible environment
for the youths in the juvenile justice system.
The trend toward innovating the juvenile delinquency and dependency
systems to focus more on the individual needs of the youths in these courts
should be encouraged. My hope is that those who strive to make these changes
can use this Note as a tool for the creation of courts that will serve their purpose
of helping youths and will withstand constitutional scrutiny.

